Le Monde diplomatique
   -----------------------------------------------------

   September 2006

           INTERNET AMATEURS CHALLENGE THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

                            A tangled web
     ___________________________________________________________

   The net is the perfect medium for counter-information, analysing
   available data on the 11 September attacks, challenging official
      findings on the events and exploiting conspiracy theories.

                                     by Pascal Lardellier
     ___________________________________________________________

     MEDIA coverage of the events of 11 September 2001 had to deal
     with an unexpected newcomer: the internet. But is the net a
     new medium or is it a counter-medium? We have to ask that
     question because the internet has encouraged circulation of a
     different type of information, while the conventional media
     relayed the standard version of the events as gospel,
     repeatedly showing nightmare images accompanied by a familiar
     institutional commentary, given by cohorts of pontificating
     experts.

     Now, information highways are a spaghetti junction of
     alternative routes easily accessible to anyone who wants to
     get away from the main routes of the politically correct and
     ethnocentric, and that egress is often a good thing. Yet the
     digital counter-information saturating the net seems to be
     produced by some new version of the old socialist
     International organisations: internet users who want to
     spread the word about their findings or feelings, perhaps
     about 9/11. Their output spreads wide and loud, as the
     internet's characteristic viral circulation has amplified the
     old word of mouth into unprecedented resonance. Electronic
     mail circulates files continuously, and can reach hundreds of
     contacts with a single mouse click.

     The meeting between relatively new technology and the
     historic disaster of 9/11 coincided with the emergence of
     blogs, those sites where people are at electronic liberty to
     air own views. While in internet chat rooms there are no
     holds barred over challenging partisan official versions,
     adducing technical, economic or political arguments in
     support (1).

     The net is a powerful tool that allows us to escape our
     hang-ups. Everyone who surfs can take part in the debate
     (often anonymously, which is also significant). They get
     involved in information in the making. Some might be
     over-zealous in their search for the truth. It is easy to
     take shortcuts when interpreting numerical data of no fixed
     abode or to consider the net an open outlet: catharsis is
     inherent in the venting of resentment.

     The net offers a lack of intermediaries, a total freedom of
     speech and instant access to all kinds of information via a
     few keywords. As scepticism of traditional media deepens,
     since they are always ready to perpetuate the system and back
     its adherents, the democratic and socially aware utopia of
     the net becomes the providential meeting-place of the
     anonymous, and also of dissenters and sceptics.

                           The 9/11 frenzy

     One reaction to 9/11 was a furious media gun battle among
     practical jokers and conspirators, in which anything went and
     the first to click gained an advantage in disseminating his
     "truth". In the interval between the collapse of the first
     World Trade Centre tower and that of the second, several
     domain names linked to the event were registered. That
     suggests either an extraordinarily cynical entrepreneurial
     spirit or the desire to take refuge in the virtual world at a
     time of disaster.

     There was also an on-line explosion of doubtful jokes,
     fantasy claims, images parodying the tragedy, summary
     counter-investigations and simplistic attempts to show the
     world in black and white; the pseudo-scientific vied with the
     irrational. For the most part the fantastic stories were read
     with amusement only by surfers who enjoy these digital
     dalliances. But a few things went further.

     The most important was the Meyssan affair. After a skilful
     pre-publication promotion campaign on the net, the book 9/11:
     The Big Lie (2) was published in France. Its author, Thierry
     Meyssan, claimed that a US missile and not a hijacked
     passenger jet hit the Pentagon. The rumour rapidly spread and
     was taken up by many elements in the media; although they
     criticised Meyssan, their coverage boosted the book's
     visibility and sales.

     At the same time, many websites were launched which made
     similar claims after analysing the same available images and
     promoted a conspiracy theory. The basic allegation was that
     the US secret services had fomented the events of 9/11 in an
     effort to provoke a mood of emotion and indignation that
     would open the way to massive rearmament and a policy of
     preemptive war. Meyssan's approach was revisionist in spirit;
     it surfed on a wave of scepticism, partly resulting from the
     definite advantage that the Bush administration had gained
     from the attacks, and it exploited some people's paranoia.

     However, obtaining and disseminating information is a process
     that has to be learnt: it has rules, including the
     verification of sources and facts. Because of the freedom
     that the net offers, some virtual investigators believe they
     can ignore those constraints. (That is not to say that some
     elements of traditional written, broadcast and televised
     media do not take the same view; they certainly do, and with
     gay abandon.)

     Five years after 9/11, the whole furore seemed to be
     subsiding into history. Nevertheless, journalists,
     researchers, teachers and even politicians are now rightly
     questioning the US administration's lack of transparency
     about the events and demanding the investigation be reopened.
     Their weapon is the net.

     Consider Dylan Avery, a young net surfer, who recently
     reopened the 9/11 dossier. In a way that recalls the
     conspiracy nerds in The X-Files, he produced a film that is
     rattling the US. Alone at home with his laptop he made Loose
     Change for $2,000: a very professional 80-minute documentary,
     easily accessible on the net. It uses the theory of a US
     conspiracy to explain the attack on the Pentagon and also,
     more audaciously, the attack on the World Trade Centre
     itself. Avery has used video documents, archives, audio
     extracts and 3D animation to create a fascinating and
     troubling document that challenges the official version of
     the attacks (3).

     Thousands of net users have followed him in scouring the net
     for evidence, looking at the videos from the major
     broadcasters, the witness statements filed at the time and
     re-reading the inquiry reports. All question the scientific
     weaknesses of the official theory. Setting aside whether such
     review is relevant, we have to allow that it takes courage to
     raise the issue in the US against the backdrop of the Patriot
     Act.

     How reliable are these documentaries? Rumour specialist
     Pascal Froissart said: "Aesthetically, they are superb:
     wonderful images, perfect narrative, with new twists every
     three minutes or three pages, stars in action . . . It's
     tremendously effective and more like the SAS, OSS-117 or
     James Bond than the Warren Commission report (4). The
     intention is less getting at the truth than producing
     spectacle. Is it for us to judge the substance? Despite the
     million pages processed, I have no knowledge of pyrotechnics,
     terrorism-ology or ballistics."

     These are the subjects on which (often pseudo) experts
     theorise, and how can you take part in inevitably technical
     debates without the necessary knowledge? How can we have
     faith in the UVOs (unidentified video objects) constantly
     encountered on the net when we know how easy it is to
     manipulate images, especially digital images? All the
     theories founder on this.

     They also play on the fears of a time when people have lost
     their points of reference, and major concerns about health,
     climate, the economy and politics are unsettling a public
     that already feels disoriented.
       ________________________________________________________

     (1) See Divina Frau-Meigs, Qui a détourné le 11 septembre?,
     De Boeck, Brussels, 2006.

     (2) First published as L'Effroyable Imposture, Carnot, Paris,
     2002; in English, 9/11: The Big Lie, Carnot Publishing,
     London, 2002.

     (3) Other documentaries are being produced, less accomplished
     than Avery's, although they all challenge the official
     version. They include Secret Evil of 9/11, 9/11 Eyewitness,
     Reopen 9/11 and The Great Conspiracy. Their audience is on
     the net.

     (4) The Warren commission. set up to investigate the
     circumstances surrounding the assassination of John F Kennedy
     in November 1963, dismissed the theory of a conspiracy in
     favour of the much criticised idea of "the lone gunman", Lee
     Harvey Oswald.

     Pascal Lardellier teaches at the University of Bourgogne; his
     most recent books are `Le Pouce et la souris' (Fayard, Paris,
     2006) and `11 septembre 2001: Que faisiez-vous ce jour-là ?'
     (L'Hèbe, Lausanne, September 2006)



                                        Translated by Julie Stoker

*****************************************************************************************

Le Monde diplomatique
   -----------------------------------------------------

   September 2006

                    A WORLD OF CONFLICT SINCE 9/11

                         Iraq's diverse Shia
     ___________________________________________________________

     It takes more than religion to form a homogeneous whole at a
      regional or national level as demonstrated by the internal
     divisions within Iraq's Shia community. Their loyalties are
                            unpredictable.

                                   by Peter Harling and Hamid Yasin
     ___________________________________________________________

     EVERY day in Iraq brings more sectarian violence between
     Sunni and Shia factions. Such attacks have become routine
     events, killing dozens of people and injuring hundreds. They
     are now much more frequent than operations targeting the
     occupation forces. In Baghdad the river Tigris forms a
     dividing line between the largely Shia left bank, al-Rusafa,
     and the mainly Sunni right bank, al-Karkh.

     There are certainly large enclaves on both sides, especially
     the districts of major religious significance, the Shia
     al-Kadhimiya and the Sunni al-Adhamiya. But the process of
     polarisation, with the emergence of genuine front lines,
     "presages increasingly violent and well-organised fighting",
     according to a representative of the Sunni Jeish Ansar
     al-Sunna armed group (1).

     Inside Iraq and abroad the predominant view is that two
     communities are competing for power: Sunni Arabs, supposedly
     loyal to the previous regime, who have lost their
     longstanding monopoly of central government; and Shia Arabs,
     traditionally excluded from politics, for whom the allied
     invasion seemed a historic chance to gain the influence they
     deserve as the demographic majority.

     This view has the advantage of being straightforward, but it
     overlooks the multiple objectives pursued by the various
     players in the Iraqi political arena. Above all it helps to
     maintain a dynamic that needs to be checked rather than
     encouraged, reducing to their lowest common denominator
     communities that are in fact highly diverse (2).

     The temptation to see the Shia as a homogeneous community is
     perceptible in the current debate on whether Shia loyalties
     are restricted to Iraq or may be offered to Iran. In December
     2004 King Abdullah of Jordan warned of an emerging "Shia
     crescent" and presented the Shia communities in the Gulf,
     Iraq, Syria and Lebanon as a fifth column that was controlled
     by Tehran and threatened Sunni interests.

     Egypt's Hosni Mubarak went further, claiming that
     historically the Shia of the Arab world had shown greater
     loyalty to Iran than to their home countries. Noted academics
     have turned such generalisations into a theory. Vali Nasr, a
     leading US expert on Islam, believes the Shia victory in the
     Iraqi election last year will remobilise all the Shia in the
     region, promoting common demands and identity, which in turn
     will serve Iranian interests (3).

     Another school of thought rejects this analysis, maintaining
     that Iraqi nationalism will prove a much stronger force. One
     experienced Iranian observer said: "Solidarity between Shia
     groups will not transcend the basic division separating Arabs
     and Persians. Everyone seems to have forgotten that the Iraqi
     Shia fought their Iranian counterparts for eight long years
     during the Iran-Iraq war, the bloodiest conflict of the
     second half of the 20th century. The information we are
     getting from Iraq suggests that Iraqis, even those who lived
     in exile in Iran, do not welcome Iranian influence in their
     country."

     This is an important debate. The resurgent Shia theory tends
     to influence policies adopted by the United States, Arab
     regimes and particularly Gulf monarchies, which see any
     Iranian ambition as inevitably hostile. The theory fuels
     hatred of the Shia, which is becoming widespread in Sunni
     circles, regardless of their politics. Few Sunni preachers in
     Iraq now refrain from referring to the Shia as rawafidh
     (heretics), a pejorative term which has long been associated
     with jihadists such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was the
     leader of al-Qaida in Iraq until his recent death.

                         Not just nationalism

     Alhough nationalism is a factor to be taken into account, it
     is not enough to explain the behaviour of Iraqi Shia during
     the war with Iran. At the time the process of nation-building
     that had started in the first half of the 20th century still
     held some promise. In the 1970s the Ba'athist regime was
     actively re-allocating resources to Iraq's south, and this
     was reflected in the large numbers of police and army
     recruits contributed by such towns as Diwaniya or Nasiriya.
     Farmers welcomed the extensive agrarian reform initiated in
     the wake of the coup and the regime's progressive policies
     won the support of many poor Shia.

     However, the regime's totalitarian methods led to the
     disappearance of the religious communities in Najaf and the
     elimination of rival political forces, particularly communism
     and Islamism. A people's army more than 500,000-strong was a
     far from negligible factor in mobilising the Shia against
     Iran.

     The turning point came with the first Gulf war in 1991 and
     the revolts that followed, heralding a period of increasing
     differentiation in collective identities. Kurdistan achieved
     a measure of independence and began to flourish after the
     civil war, at least economically. Elsewhere the model of a
     provident government based on patronage was dropped, and
     replaced by a predatory economy rooted in privilege, family
     networks and blind loyalty to the regime.

     This change particularly affected members of the Shia
     community -- officials, soldiers and small traders -- who had
     benefited the most from the opportunities for social
     advancement offered by the regime. It also affected Sunni
     Arabs and Christians, although they generally found it easier
     to access resources thanks to family networks in Iraq or
     abroad.

     In the south a policy of economic reprisals against Shia
     localities involved in the 1991 uprising aggravated the
     deepening poverty. But the idea of a martyred "Shia
     community" only really gained credence after the collapse of
     the Saddam regime in 2003, which was described by many as the
     overthrow of Sunni power. Under the political process
     initiated by the US administration, sectarian considerations
     governed the allocation of jobs, leading to competition
     between victims. Each party based its claims to a share of
     power on the scale of the suffering it had endured.

     Supporters of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution
     in Iraq (Sairi), led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, drew attention
     to the number of anti-Saddam martyrs in his family and his
     key role in the 1991 insurrection. Militants loyal to Moqtada
     al-Sadr accused the Sairi supporters of having chosen to go
     into exile, having tortured Iraqi prisoners of war on behalf
     of the Iranians and having abandoned the rebels in 1991 by
     retreating too soon to Iran. Sairi responded with accusations
     that al-Sadr supporters had served the interests of the
     regime and provided it with many informers.

     The rewriting of Iraqi history to allow for a Sunni-Shia
     dichotomy dispelled any idea of Iraqi nationalism. Iraqis of
     different origins have lost the points of reference they once
     shared. The key events of the recent past, such as the end of
     the monarchy in 1958, the Ba'ath takeover in 1968, the first
     Gulf war of 1991 or the Anglo-American intervention of 2003,
     are now giving rise to bitter disputes reflecting sectarian
     divisions.

     There is no longer any attempt to redistribute national
     resources. Everyone is shamelessly trying to corner them for
     their own ends, with public bodies being broken up and
     privatised under the control of specific groups. People still
     say Iraq will surmount its divisions, but it is no longer
     clear what its national identity means. In practice, the
     arbitrary violence, nepotism and unprecedented corruption all
     demonstrate how important non-national loyalties have become.

     Nevertheless this does not mean that Iran is the nation, by
     default or by adoption, to which Iraqi Shia turn. People in
     the south still have mixed feelings about their "Persian"
     neighbours. Al-Sadr exploits the Iranian origins of Ayatollah
     Ali al-Sistani in order to criticise him. The citizens of the
     town of al-Amara refer to their Kut counterparts as
     "Persians", which they consider a contemptuous term.
     Portraits of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his successor,
     Ali Khamenei, are seen more often, but few Shia politicians
     recognise the Iranian concept of velayat-e faqih
     (guardianship of jurisprudence), which is a pillar of the
     Islamic Republic. Statements by al-Sistani about his Iranian
     counterparts have always been diplomatic, carefully staying
     within certain limits, yet firmly independent. Indeed he
     seems to rank more highly in Iran than its own supreme
     leader, Khamenei, when it comes to the interpretation of the
     holy scriptures.

     Iran is playing its hand in Iraq with great subtlety,
     spreading its influence through many channels. Tehran has
     encouraged its allies to take part in the political process,
     the better to direct it. But it has also sought to establish
     links with all the political players, including al-Sadr, the
     sworn enemy of its ally, Sairi.

     At a local level Iran sponsors smaller groups, such as Tha'r
     Allah in Basra, without exposing itself directly. It has
     given only limited support to attacks against the coalition,
     and held back from providing insurgents with the anti-tank
     weapons that Hizbullah has received in Lebanon. The Khamenei
     establishment provides scholarships and books in Najaf. The
     high standard of reporting on the Iranian satellite
     television channel al-Alam has won a large audience among
     Iraqi Shia.

     The Islamic Republic of Iran has also made good use of
     humanitarian work and economic investment to create a
     positive image for itself. Unlike the Gulf emirates, it
     welcomes tourists and pilgrims. Its comparative prosperity
     and tranquillity has made a big impression, revealing a more
     friendly and open country than many expected.

     Surprisingly, Iran's strategy is not based on a sense of
     allegiance but on its understanding of the Shia, whose
     diversity it recognises, along with their different
     collective identities. Iran realises that there is a deep
     social divide between conservative Shia (the religious
     community in Najaf, traders in the holy cities, urban middle
     classes) and the "revolutionary" masses who support
     al-Sadr (4).

     Each of the southern towns has specific characteristics and
     problems. Kut is a small provincial centre that distances
     itself from the devolutionary demands of much of the south.
     Various groups are keen to command the holy city of Najaf,
     currently controlled by Sistani and Sairi. In Basra, several
     Islamist parties and their militias are struggling to gain
     control of resources, especially contraband oil.

     The further you get from Baghdad, where confrontation between
     the Sunni and Shia communities makes it easier for each side
     to maintain a semblance of unity, the more the potential for
     violence between Shia groups becomes apparent. This is in
     stark contrast to the constant talk of reform and new
     initiatives in the capital.
       ________________________________________________________

     (1) For an analysis of the main armed opposition groups, see
     International Crisis Group, "In their own words", Middle East
     Report, n� 50, Washington, 15 February 2006.

     (2) See Ahmad Salamatian, "Arab spring: late and cold", Le
     Monde diplomatique, English language edition, July 2005.

     (3) Vali Nasr, "When the Shiites rise", Foreign Affairs, vol
     85, n� 4, New York, July-August 2006.

     (4) International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Moqtada al-Sadr",
     Middle East Report, no 55, Washington, 11 July 2006.

     Peter Harling is responsible for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon at
     the International Crisis Group and Hamid Yasin is preparing a
     doctoral thesis at the Paris Institute of Political Science



                                       Translated by Harry Forster


******************************************************************************************

+

When Hezbollah operative and diamond trader Samih Ossailly was arrested in Belgium in April of 2002, one of the items found in a search of his apartment was an End-Use Certificate (EUC) for a shipment of 113 tons of arms from the Ukraine to the Ivory Coast.  So what was an Israeli arms dealer doing in possession of an identical EUC? The answer is convoluted but revealing. Ready?

The story begins with Al Qaeda diamonds.  Shortly after the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the US began aggressively searching for ways to disrupt Al Qaeda's financing.  In 1998 the Clinton Administration succeeded in freezing some $240 million in assets belonging to either Al Qaeda or the Taliban.  This led Al Qaeda to restructure its finances.  Since Afghanistan was mineral rich yet had no regulating authority, both the Taliban, along with its allies, and the Northern Alliance gained experience in trading gemstones for arms, and to fund their political operations.  Civil war-torn Sierra Leone and the endemic corruption in Liberia provided perfect conditions for Al Qaeda operatives to do the same providing they had a way to enter the area.   Luckily they had an old friend in Ibrahim Bah.

Long before his current trial in The Hague for war crimes, former Liberian President Charles Taylor underwent training in Libya under Bah, a Senegalese national and ex-Mujahadeen/ex-Hezbollah.  Upon his return to Liberia in 1989, Taylor led a rebellion which eventually led to his 1997 election and ensuing dictatorship.   Taylor bestowed upon Bah the rank of general in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group backed by Taylor that was seeking power in Sierra Leone, infamous for amputating the limbs of noncombatants.  The RUF launched its civil war in 1991 with Bah as the official arms and diamonds broker for both the RUF and Taylor.   The violence generated by Taylor in both Liberia and Sierra Leone led the United Nations to establish an arms embargo on Liberia in 1992 and in 1997 against Sierra Leone, followed by an embargo of West African "blood diamonds" that financed the violence.

In January of 2006, retired Israeli Defense Forces Colonel Yair Klein was invited to Liberia by Simon Rosenblum, an Israeli businessman formerly based in Abdijan, Ivory Coast.  During Taylor's reign, Rosenblum was a member of his inner circle.  He carried a Liberian diplomatic passport, owned logging and road constructions interests in Liberia and his trucks were used to carry weapons from Liberia to the border with Sierra Leone.  Klein arrived in Liberia after Taylor had been deposed, but when his presence became known he was forced to flee the country, and with good reason.  From 1996 until 1999, Klein provided material and training to Liberia's Anti-Terrorism Unit and, in violation of the UN embargo, to the RUF as part of a diamonds-for-arms operation involving Klein and two other Israelis, Dov Katz and Dan Gertler.  In January of 1999 Klein was arrested in Sierra Leone on charges of smuggling arms to the RUF.  Those transactions went through Bah, the "gatekeeper" for such dealings in the RUF-controlled territory as well as being an Al Qaeda businessman.

Klein's Anti-Terrorism Unit, a group widely criticized for gross abuses of human rights, was headed by "Chuckie" Taylor, the president's son, but Klein and Rosenblum weren't the only Israelis involved with the Taylors and Bah.   Along with the $500,000 worth of diamonds in his possession, in a briefcase searched upon his August, 2000 arrest in Italy, Leonid Minin, a Ukrainian-born Israeli member of the "Odessa Mafia," was found to be in possession of correspondence detailing his sale to the Liberian government of millions of dollars worth of arms in exchange for diamonds and timber concessions.  Minin had extensive dealings with Bah, but perhaps the most interesting item found in Minin's briefcase was that End-Use-Certificate for 113 tons of ammunition and arms that exactly matched the End-Use-Certificate found in the apartment of Hezbollah operative Samih Ossailly.

Hezbollah has a long history of diamond trading in Sierra Leone, Liberia and other West African countries.   Samih Ossailly and Aziz Nassour, Hezbollah operatives who also provided services for Al Qaeda diamond merchants, stand out in particular as traders.  When Al Qaeda approached Bah for an "in" to diamond trading in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Bah went to Nassour for help.

Hezbollah's activity in diamond trading has mostly been limited to Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  Israel, too, has long had ties in the area.  Back in 1983, Israel was contracted to train and equip Mobutu Sese Seko's presidential guard, the notorious Division Speciale Presidentielle.  It was during this time that Shimon Yelnik, an Israeli army officer in charge of Seko's presidential guard, became acquainted with Aziz Nassour.   About a decade later, in late 2000, when Nassour needed arms to ensure his continued diamond enterprises in Liberia and Sierra Leone, he contacted his Yelnik, by then brokering arms in Panama, as revealed in an investigation by the Organization of American States into Yelnik's involvement with Columbian paramilitaries. The investigation also uncovered faxes between Bah and Yelnik and attempts to both avoid and make fraudulent End-Use Certificates in order to break the UN arms embargo.   Investigative journalist Douglas Farah quotes one European intelligence agent as saying, "The likelihood these types of weapons were going to the RUF rebels in the bush is very hard to believe," leading to speculation that the weapons were actually destined for the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The contact between Israeli diamond dealers, extending beyond Sierra Leone and Liberia to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola, and their counterparts in Hezbollah and Al Qaeda is well summed up by Farah in his book Blood from Stones:

 

An Israeli diamond dealer, who regularly did business with buyers he knew were Hezbollah and some he suspected were Al Qaeda, agreed.  "Here it is business," he said.  "The wars are over there.  Here we do business, there they do war."
 

This picture that emerges from these relationships is not only one of war crimes, profiteering, massive environmental destruction, corruption and greed, but one of Israelis, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda all working together in mutually profitable enterprises, regardless of principle or ideology.  With nationals or operatives of all three known to be operating in the region still today, it remains to be seen if such relationships continue.



Jimmy Johnson is a researcher on Israel's arms exports with the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions.  He can be reached at jimmy@icahd.org



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